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I. INTRODUCTION**
Foreign investors in China face a legal system and legal issues that are
very different from those found in the United States. This article seeks to
illustrate some of the important differences in China's corporate law that
govern or affect foreign investors' interests. The purpose of this article is to
help foreign investors become aware of legal problems and investment risks
in creating a foreign-invested enterprise in China. This article also pro-
poses changes to existing Chinese laws that will more reasonably accom-
modate the legal concerns and protect the legal interests of foreign investors
(as well as incidentally benefiting domestic Chinese investors).
A. Company Law
The passage of the Company Law of the People's Republic of China'
("Company Law") by the National People's Congress of China ("NPC") in
1993 was applauded by both the legal and business worlds as a milestone in
the legal and economic history of China. The Company Law's historical
significance and its legal influence on China's transformation into a market-
oriented economy may not be easily disputed. The goals of the Company
Law are to regulate and standardize the organization and conduct of com-
panies, to protect the legitimate interests of companies' shareholders and
creditors, and to stimulate the development of a socialist market economy.
2
Or, as commonly understood, the Company Law is meant to help shape
China's planned economic system into a market-oriented system by shifting
the control of business organizations from government to private citizens.
The Company Law is the first national legislation in China that ex-
pressly recognizes the legality of limited liability forms of business organi-
*" For English versions of Chinese laws or China legal research, see Wei Luo, How to
Find the Law of the People's Republic of China: A Research Guide and Selective Annotated
Bibliography, 88 LAW LIBR. J. 402 (1996). Due to accuracy considerations, the Chinese
laws cited in this article are mostly based on the author's own translations.
EDITOR'S NOTE: The Editors of the Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business relied on the author's translations for the following Chinese laws: the Law of the
PRC on Wholly State Owned Industrial Enterprises, see infra notes 3, 120; the Provisional
Regulation of the PRC on Private Enterprises, see infra notes 3, 120; the Regulation for the
Registration and Administration of Enterprise Legal Persons on the PRC, see infra notes 26,
27, 31, 91; the Rules on Capital Contributions by the Parties of Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint
Ventures, see infra notes 78, 102; the Contract Law of the PRC, see infra note 89; and the
Law of Wholly Individual Owned Enterprises, see infra note 120.
1 See COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (ZhongHua RenMin GongHe
Guo GongSiFa) (passed on December 29, 1993 and came into effect on July 1, 1994) (PRC)
[hereinafter Company Law]. For a general overview of the Company Law, see DANIEL A.
LAPRES & YUEJIAN ZHANG, BusiNEss LAW IN CHINA (1997); Yabo Lin, New Forms and Or-
ganizational Structures of Foreign Investment In China Under the Company Law of the PRC,
7 TRANSNAT'L LAW 327 (1994).
2 Company Law, art. 1.
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zations wholly established by Chinese nationals, and also the legality of
private Chinese citizens' ownership of such organizations. Furthermore, it
is also the first national legislation in China that implicitly recognizes for-
eign investors' ability to participate in a Chinese Joint Stock Company, and
the first national legislation that recognizes their right to establish repre-
sentative offices in China.
4
The historical significance of the Company Law is not questioned in
this article. However, in the six years since the enactment of the Company
Law, it has become evident that ambiguities and imperfections in the law
threaten to impede its successful operation. Serious structural problems
exist, and these problems, if unresolved in the near future, would substan-
tially undermine the ultimate goal that the Company Law purports to ac-
complish.
Three types of companies are provided for in the Company Law: the
Wholly State-Owned Company (Guo You Du Zi Gong Si), the Limited Li-
ability Company (You Xian Ze Ren Gong Si, similar to a closely held corpo-
ration in the United States), and the Joint Stock Company Limited (Cu Fen
You Xian Gong Si, also translated as "Company Limited By Shares"). A
limited liability company is defined in the Company Law as a company or-
ganized by at least two but no more than fifty shareholders who are liable
3 NPC legislation that was passed before the Company Law mainly dealt with Wholly
State Owned Enterprises. One such example is the Law of the PRC on Wholly State Owned
Industrial Enterprises. LAW OF THE PRC ON WHOLLY STATE OWNED INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES (ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo QuanMin SuoYouZhi GongYe QiYe Fa)
(promulgated by the NPC on April 13, 1988) (PRC). Although a 1988 interim regulation of
the State Council recognized private ownership in a limited liability company, such recogni-
tion was not embodied in national legislation of the NPC until the promulgation of the Com-
pany Law. See PROVISIONAL REGULATION OF THE PRC ON PRIVATE ENTERPRISES (ZhongHua
RenMin GongHe Guo SiYing QiYe ZanXing TiaoLi) (promulgated on June 25, 1988 by the
State Council) arts. 2, 9 (PRC) [hereinafter "Provisional Regulation on Private Enterprises"];
Company Law, arts. 3, 4.
Only a Chinese company or other business entity may establish joint ventures with for-
eign investors. Laws for foreign invested enterprises do not allow Chinese individuals to
participate in joint ventures with foreign investors. See LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA ON CHINESE-FoREIGN EQUITY JOINT VENTURES (ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo
ZhongWai HeZuo JingYing QiYeFa) (promulgated on April 16, 1988) art. 1 (PRC) [herein-
after EJV Law]; see also LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON CHINESE-FOREIGN
CONTRACTUAL JOINT VENTURES (ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo ZhongWai HeZuo Jin-
gYing QiYeFa) (promulgated on April 16, 1988) art. 1 (PRC) [hereinafter CJV Law].4Nowhere do the FIE laws explicitly mention the "foreign-invested joint stock com-
pany." However, article 75 of the Company Law requires that in order to incorporate a joint
stock company (Company Limited By Shares), more than half of the five or more incorpo-
rators must have their domicile within the territory of China. So impliedly, some of the in-
corporators could be foreigners who are not domiciled in China. Company Law, art. 75
Before the passage of the Company Law, the previous regulation governing the estab-
lishment of foreign representative offices was an interim provisions promulgated by the State
Council on October 30, 1980 (Interim Provisions of the PRC On the Administration of Resi-
dent Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises). Company Law, art. 9.
477
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for the company's debts to the extent of their capital contributions.' This
article will examine the existing legal and practical problems related to
Limited Liability Companies ("LLC" or "LLCs") under both the Company
Law and laws for Foreign-Invested Enterprises.
B. Laws for Foreign-Invested Enterprises
A brief overview of China's laws regarding Foreign-Invested Enter-
prises is necessary and helpful at the outset of this article.6 The collective
concept of a Foreign-Invested Enterprise ("FIE") encompasses three types
of enterprises: Equity Joint Venture ("EJN"), Contractual Joint Venture
("CJV") and Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise ("WFOE").7 Each type of
enterprise is governed by its respective laws and regulations.
1. Equity Joint Venture
An EJV is a limited liability company owned by both Chinese and for-
eign investors in which the foreign investors' capital contributions should
not be less than 25% of the total registered capital.8 All EJVs are legal per-
5 Company Law, arts. 3, 20.
6For a general overview of China's FIE laws, see Lapres and Zhang, supra note I; see
also JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-
INVESTED ENTERPRISES 47 (1999).
7The main regulations applicable to EJVs are the Law of the People's Republic of China
on Chinese Foreign Equity Joint Ventures and Regulations for the Implementation of Law of
the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures. See EJV Law;
REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON
CHINESE-FOREIGN EQUITY JOINT VENTURES (promulgated on Sept. 20, 1983 by the State
Council, amended on Jan. 15, 1986) (PRC) [hereinafter EJV Implementation].
The main regulations applicable to CJVs are the Law of the People's Republic of China
on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures and Detailed Rules for the Implementation of
Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures.
CN Law; DETAILED RULES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA ON CHINESE-FOREIGN CONTRACTUAL JOINT VENTURES (promulgated on Sept. 4, 1995
by Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, also called MOFTEC) (PRC)
[hereinafter CJV rules].
The main regulations applicable to WFOEs are the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises and Detailed Rules for the Implementation of
Law of the People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises. LAW OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON WHOLLY FOREIGN OWNED ENTERPRISES (ZlzongHua Ren-
Min GongHeGuo WaiShang DuZi QiYeFa) (promulgated on April 12, 1986) (PRC) [herein-
after WFOE Law]; DETAILED RULES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON WHOLLY FOREIGN-OWNED ENTERPRISES (promulgated on Oct. 28,
1988, by the State Council) (PRC) [hereinafter WFOE rules].
The FIE laws themselves are generally very short and skeletal. The laws generally cited
and used in practice are the implementing regulations and rules that are much more extensive
and practical than the FIE laws.
8See EJV Law, art. 4.
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sons under Chinese law.9 The ENV is the principal form adopted by foreign
investors in China so far.
2. Contractual Joint Venture
A CJV is a company operated under a contract between Chinese and
foreign enterprises.' 0 Although a CJV does not have to be a legal person, a
CJV that satisfies the requirements of a legal person under Chinese law
shall obtain such status.1 A CJV differs from an EJV in that a CJV has
more flexibility its rules of incorporation and profit distribution. Examples
include: (1) a CJV need not meet the higher legal standard of a legal person;
(2) the requirements of capital contribution are generally more lenient; (3)
the contract may agree that foreign parties may recoup their investments
first; and (4) recoupment of investment may occur even before the income
tax of the CIV is paid.'
2
3. Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
A WFOE is a business entity wholly owned by foreign investors. 3 A
WFOE shall acquire the status of a legal person if it meets the requisite
conditions.
14
4. Defining "Foreign Investments"
A basic question arises regarding China's FIE legal regimes: what is
the legal standard of "foreign" versus "domestic"? The legal treatment for
foreign investments differs significantly from that for domestic investments
in terms of establishment procedures, approval standards, management
structures, income tax treatment, and tariff consequences; therefore, a clear
standard is necessary to ensure that the proper laws are applied. Unfortu-
nately, no standard at all was provided by the relevant laws and imple-
menting regulations. A practical standard generally used by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation ("MOFTEC") 5 is to examine the
source of the investments. If the investment comes from outside the terri-
tory of China, it is usually characterized as a "foreign investment" even if it
originates from Chinese nationals or companies. For the purpose of this
characterization, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are treated as being out-
9 See EJV Implementation, art. 2.
'0 See CJV Law, art. 2.
" See id.
12See CJV Law, arts. 2, 8, 22.
3See WFOE Law, art. 2.
14See WFOE Law, art. 8.
15Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation ("MOFTEC") is a government
agency with branches all over the country in charge of the examination and approval of FIEs.
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side China's territory.' 6 An exception to this source-oriented rule applies to
the use of profits from existing FIEs operating within China's territory. If
such profits are used for investment in China, they are treated as "foreign
investments" so as to enjoy the preferential legal treatments given to foreign
investments.17
Unless otherwise provided, the term "LLC" hereinafter includes lim-
ited liability companies incorporated under both the Company Law and
EJV law, and the term "FIE" includes all three types of foreign-invested
enterprises.
C. Choices of Law for Incorporation
A foreign company seeking to establish a subsidiary in China has sev-
eral options. It may incorporate as an equity joint venture under the EJV
law, a contractual joint venture (with or without legal-person status) under
the CJV law, or a wholly foreign-owned enterprise under the WFOE law.
Moreover, it may also incorporate as a LLC under the Company Law18 or
even a foreign-invested joint stock company under the Company Law.' 9
Such choices of law depend solely on investors' preferences, and a joint
venture incorporated under one law will not be later recharacterized by the
government for any purpose, including income tax purposes. 20 Further,
joint ventures incorporated under one law may be reorganized by the in-
vestors into a different format under another law as long as it meets the re-
quirements of the other law.
A FIE incorporated under one FIE law (e.g., CJV law) would not be
governed by another FIE law even if it operates more like a corporate form
under another FIE law (e.g., EJV law). Further, FIE law would not govern
a foreign-invested LLC or joint stock company incorporated under the
Company Law because the FIE laws only apply to companies that have
chosen to be incorporated under them.
The reverse is not necessarily true; companies incorporated under FIE
law may be governed by the Company Law in some cases. Under Article
16PROVISIONS OF STATE COUNCIL FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
(GuoWuYuan GuangYu GuLl WaiShang TouZi De GuiDing) (promulgated on Oct. 11, 1986)
art. 20 (PRC) [hereinafter "Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment"].
17 In addition, the FIE's may petition for a refund of income tax allocated to the profits
used for reinvestment. See EJV Law, art. 7; WFOE Law, art. 17; Provisions for the Encour-
agement of Foreign Investment, art. 10.
18The Company Law applies to limited liability companies with foreign investment.
Company Law, art. 18.
1 Company Law, art. 75.
20 In the U.S., the Internal Revenue Service may classify a foreign entity for U.S. tax pur-
poses by applying the U.S. Internal Revenue Code rather than by applying the foreign law
governing the entity. See, Norman N. Nystrom, Entity Characterization Issues In The Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 839, 843 (1996). However, this is not
the case in China.
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18, the Company Law applies to "limited liability companies with foreign
investment." However, the FIE laws prevail over the Company Law if the
FIE laws provide otherwise. Thus, presumably, the Company Law will ap-
ply to both the foreign-invested LLCs incorporated under the Company
Law and FIEs that are incorporated under the FIE laws and have limited li-
ability (e.g., EJVs).2
Therefore, the relationship between the Company Law and FIE laws is
that of general to special laws. The legal implications of this relationship
are threefold. First, where the Company Law is silent, the specialized pro-
visions of the FIE Laws should apply. Second, where the Company law
and FIE laws conflict, the latter prevails. Third, where the FIE laws are si-
lent, the general principles of the Company Law apply. It is the third point
that gives rise to some practical problems, some of which will be discussed
in Part II of this article.
D. Registration by Approval
In the United States, a corporation is created when articles of incorpo-
ration are filed with the secretary of state in the state where the corporation
intends to do business. 22 The secretary of state has a duty to file the docu-
ments for incorporation if, on their face, the documents satisfy the require-
ments of the law.23 In other words, the secretary of state has no authority to
judge the substantive validity of the documents or information provided,
except for the corporation's name.24
In China, however, a corporation is created or registered not by right,
but by approval. The MOFTEC, which is in charge of examining and ap-
proving FIEs, and the SAIC,25 which is in charge of the registrations of
companies and business organizations, will examine the substantive validity
of all the application documents and underlying acts of incorporation. The
State Administrative of Industry and Commerce ("SAIC") will not approve
the application unless it is satisfied with the procedural and substantive va-
lidity of the information in the document, including but not limited to, the
company name, the business purpose, the qualification of the legal repre-
21 Under article 4 of EJV Law, an EJV is a limited liability company. EJV Law, art. 4.
22 See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT §2.03(a) (1984); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §104(e)
(West 1999).
23See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 1.25(a) (1984).
24See id., at §§1.25(d), 4.01. However, in some states, like New York, simply making a
filing does not constitute approval of the corporation name. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §
104(e) (West 1999).
25 The State Administrative of Industry and Commerce ("SAIC") is a government agency
and has branches all over the country in charge of the registrations of all business organiza-
tions.
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sentative, the qualifications of directors, and the supervisors.26 Further-
more, any later changes to the registered information are only effective
upon the approval of the relevant registration authorities.
27
E. The Difference Between the Appearance and the Reality of the Law
For foreign companies doing business in China, one thing that must be
understood is that China's written laws do not necessarily reflect Chinese
law in practice. The effects of this problem are twofold. First, the rights
guaranteed to a person or corporation by law or by the constitution may in
fact be wholly or partially invalidated or abridged by a governmental
agency. For example, a corporation may be required by a local government
to submit a monetary contribution (other than taxes) that is not prescribed
or even expressly prohibited by law. Such an aggrieved party has no re-
course from the judicial system except where the specific governmental ac-
tion is the imposition of an administrative penalty defined by administrative
procedure, in which case the court may invalidate the administrative pen-
alty.28 Second, the mandatory requirements of the law may sometimes be
disregarded by the agency in charge of law enforcement. For example, the
requirement that shareholders of a foreign-owned holding or investment
corporation should contribute at least U.S. $30 million (or its equivalent) to
the corporation's registered capital is often disregarded by local govern-
ments that are eager to attract foreign investors to their territories.
Part of the explanation for this problem is the de facto supreme posi-
tion of the Communist Party in China, a position arguably supported by the
ambiguous language in the constitution.2 Thus, in practice, the policies of
the Communist Party of China are essentially superior to the constitution
and to governmental legislation. The policies of the Communist Party
change so frequently that it is not uncommon in China that some laws,
though properly enacted and technically effective, can in fact be "repealed"
by the policies of the Communist Party, and therefore in actuality are not
26 See REGULATION FOR THE REGISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF ENTERPRISE LEGAL
PERSONS OF THE PRC (ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo QiYeFaRen DengJi GuanLi TiaoLi)
(promulgated by State Council on June 6, 1988) arts. 7, 9, 15 (PRC) [hereinafter "Regulation
for Legal Persons"); REGULATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON ADMINISTRATION
OF REGISTRATION OF COMPANIES (ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo GongSi DengJi GuanLi
TiaoLi) (promulgated on June 24, 1994) arts. 9, 10 (PRC) [hereinafter "Regulation of Regis-
tration of Companies"].
27 See Regulation for Legal Persons, art. 17; Regulation of Registration of Companies, art.
23.
2
8 See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo XingZheng SuSongFa) (adopted at the Second Session of
the Seventh National People's Congress on April 4, 1989) art. 2, Cl. 11 (PRC).
29 See CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (ZhongHua RenMin Gong-
HeGuo XianFa) (adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in
1982, as amended) Preamble §§ 7, 10 (PRC).
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enforced. Therefore, parties interested in doing business in China should be
aware that some provisions of the Company Law and the FIE laws are not
strictly enforced and are sometimes even totally disregarded by relevant
governmental agencies; and that some governmental agencies may, without
any statutory authority, impose additional requirements to the written laws
and regulations.
However, one point worth emphasizing is that, despite the interference
of the Communist Party, de jure law in China is still respected and recog-
nized in the majority of situations, especially in the area of corporate law.
In fact, in a communist country such as China, it is the Communist Party
that controls the initiation and passage of legislation, therefore legislation
would not possibly be passed without the consent and support of the Com-
munist Party. Nevertheless, because the written law in China is not always
the same as the actual law, consultation with a competent Chinese attorney
is a necessity for foreigners contemplating an investment in China.
II. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
A. Structural Inconsistencies Between the Company Law and FIE Laws
Question: Is a LLC incorporated under the FIE laws also governed by
the Company Law? If so, is it practically possible for the LLC to comply
with both the Company Law and FIE laws?
In the United States, the same corporate law generally governs the in-
corporation requirements for both domestic and foreign investors.3 In
China, on the other hand, investors have a choice of several types of organ-
izational structures under which to incorporate, each of which is governed
by different laws with different requirements.
Generally, the Company Law regulates and standardizes the organiza-
tion and conduct of "domestic enterprises," a concept used in China to refer
31
to companies organized by Chinese nationals or enterprise legal persons.
Thus, the Company Law arguably was not intended to regulate FIEs, a spe-
cial business sector in China.
Nevertheless, Article 18 of the Company Law states that the Company
Law also applies to "foreign-invested limited liability companies." But in
practice, the FIE laws prevail over the Company Law in areas specifically
addressed by the FIE laws. As discussed above, only where the FIE laws
30 For example, New York has eliminated requirements as to citizenship and residence of
incorporators. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §401 (West 1999).
31 An "enterprise legal person" in China means a business entity that may independently
undertake its civil liability. See GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo MinFa TongZe) (adopted at the
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, promulgated by Order No. 37 of the
President of the People's Republic of China on April 12, 1986, and effective as of January 1,
1987) art. 37 (PRC) [hereinafter "Civil Law"]; Regulation for Legal Persons, art. 7.
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are silent on a specific point do the general principles of the Company Law
apply.
However, the structure of the Company Law differs so dramatically
from that of the FIE laws that sometimes it is impractical to apply the Com-
pany Law to FIEs. Under the Company Law, the highest authority in a
LLC is its "shareholders' meeting, ' 32 whereas under the E-V law, a board
of directors is the highest authority. Shareholders' meetings are not even
considered an authoritative body in companies incorporated under the FIE
laws.33 (See infra Part II, Heading B, discussing the powers and functions
of shareholders' meeting and board of directors.) This structural disparity
makes it impractical to apply the Company Law to PIEs.
For example, Article 52 of the Company Law requires that all LLCs
establish a board of supervisors or a sole supervisor. The board of supervi-
sors should consist of representatives appointed or elected by both share-
holders and employees (See infra Part II, Heading C, discussing the power
and functions of the board of supervisors.) Since the FIE laws are silent on
this matter, theoretically Article 52 should also apply to PIEs. Thus, the
FIEs should also establish a board of supervisors or a sole supervisor. The
problem, however, is to determine the procedure by which the shareholders
of an EJV appoint the supervisors. Since the shareholders' meeting is not a
decision-making body in an EJV, the EJV law does not provide convoca-
tion and voting procedures for shareholders. Although the board of direc-
tors is the highest authority in an EJV, it is arguably inappropriate for it to
appoint the supervisors who, in turn, would be responsible for supervising
them.
Another example is the transfer of shares in a LLC. Under the EJV
law, the transfer of a shareholder's capital contribution in an ElV's regis-
tered capital requires the unanimous consent of all attending directors34 and
also the consent of the non-transferring shareholders. 35 But the EJV law
fails to provide guidance if, for example, an attending director abstains from
voting, one or more directors simply fail or refuse to attend the proposed
board meeting causing the meeting to fall short of the quorum requirement
(see infra Part IV, discussing deadlock), or a shareholder fails or refuses to
respond to another shareholder's proposed transfer of shares.
Detailed provisions are very important in China because they are the
only guidelines for Chinese companies and judges. In China-essentially a
civil law country-the only sources of law are statutes (promulgated by the
NPC), and the rules and regulations promulgated by the administrative
branches of the central and local governments in accordance with those
32 Company Law, art. 37.
33See EJV Law, art. 6; EJV Implementation, art. 33.
34 See EJV Implementation, art. 36.35See EJV Implementation, art. 23.
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statutes. The role of the courts is limited to applying the law, and in doing
so, a court must not deviate from the literal language of the law. Courts and
judges in China have no authority to make law, either by making inferences
from the law or by applying equitable remedies.
In contemplation of the foregoing situations, the Company Law pro-
vides that a shareholder who does not agree to the transfer of shares of an-
other shareholder must purchase the shares in question. A failure to
purchase the shares is considered a consent to the transfer.36 Due to the
structural inconsistency between the Company Law and the FIE law, how-
ever, this provision of the Company Law only partially solves the problem,
and some of the foregoing situations are still left unresolved.
The Company Law may resolve the situation where shareholders in an
EJV fail or refuse to respond to a proposal to transfer shares. However, it
does not address what course should be taken if the board of directors,
whose consent is necessary to transfer shares in an EJV, fails or refuses to
consent to a share transfer. It is obviously improper to require the non-
cooperating directors, as officers of the company, to purchase the shares in
question. Neither is it appropriate to require the shareholders who ap-
pointed the non-cooperating directors to purchase the shares since the di-
rectors are supposed to act independently of shareholders.
In light of these dilemmas, it is no surprise that as a practical matter,
the SAIC and MOFTEC do not apply the Company Law to FIEs at all.
Some attorneys in China argue that the Company Law is not intended to
govern the FEs because the term "foreign-invested limited liability compa-
nies" in Article 12 of the Company Law should be distinctive from the LLC
concept under the FIE laws. Under their view, the former is a narrow con-
cept and includes only LLCs organized under the specialized requirements
of the Company Law, whereas the latter is a general legal concept covering
all companies with a limited liability feature. This view, however, is not
supported by the ambiguous language of the Company law and is contra-
dicted by the clear language of the EJV law, which states that "[a]n EJV
shall take the form of a limited liability company.
3 7
Suggestion: Either the Company Law or FIE laws should be amended
to remedy the structural inconsistencies that cause these confusions and
problems.
36Unfortunately, the Company Law fails to define what constitutes a "failure" and
whether a mere lapse of time could constitute such "failure." Company Law, art. 35
37 Company Law, art. 18 (This lav applies to limited liability companies with foreign in-
vestment.); EJV Law, art. 4.
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B. A "Mandatorily Sterilized" Board of Directors Under the Company Law
Question: Should the board of directors or the shareholders' meeting
be responsible for the centralized management of a foreign-owned LLC in-
corporated under the Company Law?
Generally in the United States, all corporate power is exercised and
managed by a board of directors.3 3 Shareholders may only vote on resolu-
tions already passed by the board.39 The structures of China's FIE laws
generally follow this format.40 By contrast, a U.S. corporation with 50 or
fewer shareholders may dispense with or limit the authorities of a board of
directors by describing in its articles of incorporation who will perform
some or all of the duties of a board of directors-a situation referred to as a
"sterilized board., 41
In China, under the current structure of the Company Law, a sterilized
board of directors is mandatory for all LLCs (and also all Joint Stock Com-
panies Limited). Under Article 37 of the Company Law, the shareholders'
meeting is the LLCs' highest authority. The shareholders' meeting is
granted the power to decide the company's investment plan and approve the
company's budget and profit distribution. Also, the shareholders' meeting
makes resolutions with regard to the increase or decrease of a company's
registered capital, the issuance of bonds, the amendment of articles of in-
corporation, and the merger, division, and dissolution of the company.42
These shareholder powers and functions are generally performed by
boards of directors in the United States, and by the boards of directors of
FIEs in China. It is doubtful that shareholders, who are sometimes outside
the centralized management of the company, possess the requisite knowl-
edge and familiarity with the company's operations to perform these de-
tailed functions. This is especially true when the corporation is a large-
scale LLC or public Joint Stock Company Limited (Company Limited By
Shares).
While the Company Law takes away most of the authority that the di-
rectors of a LLC traditionally possess and vests it in the shareholders'
meeting, the Company Law also grants the board of directors some of the
powers that managers normally possess. For example, in addition to the di-
rectors' traditional power to appoint officers and make bylaws, the board of
38See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §8.01 (1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §701 (McKin-
ney 2000).39 See Anna M. Han, China's Company Law: Practicing Capitalism In a Transitional
Economy, 5 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 457, 478 (1996).
40 The Board of Directors determines all the major issues of the equity joint venture. EJV
Law, art.6. The Board of Directors is the highest organ of authority of the EJV. EJV Im-
plementation, art. 33.
41 For the use of term "sterilized board", see, e.g., William A. Musgrove , Business and
Corporate Law, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1219, 1244 (1996).42 See Company Law, art. 38.
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directors of a LLC also drafts the company's budget plan and profit distri-
bution plan (to submit to the shareholders' meeting for approval),43 tasks
normally performed by the general manager and leading financial officer.
In practice, however, it is difficult for directors to perform such detailed
functions when none of the directors are, at the same time, managers or
other officers of the company.
The legislative intent behind this structure was never officially pub-
lished in China. The state may be trying to maintain control over the LLCs,
especially those in which the state participates." A second reason may be
the legislators' belief that China so far lacks sufficient numbers of profes-
sional managers. China has been a market economy for only twenty years,
so a large group of professional managers has yet to emerge. This situation,
together with the insufficiency of ethical standards for managers to observe,
may create in the legislators' minds a general distrust toward the directors
and managers of currently existing companies.
This "mandatorily sterilized" board structure has produced ironic re-
sults in practice. In shareholders' meetings, the voting power of sharehold-
ers is exercised by so-called "shareholders' representatives." The
representatives of the controlling or majority shareholders are usually one
or more of the directors. Thus, when the board of directors signs its resolu-
tion and submits it to the shareholders' meeting for approval, the resolution
essentially has already been approved by the shareholders' meeting since
the controlling shareholders' representatives have already signed the reso-
lution.
Nevertheless, a shareholders' meeting-an often lengthy but in fact
useless exercise-must be held according to the Company Law. A separate
document called "Resolution of Shareholders' Meeting" has to be signed
again by one or more of the directors in their capacities as shareholders'
representatives. This "double resolution" or "double signature" also results
when an executive director, as a substitute of a board of directors, is estab-
lished under Article 51 of the Company Law. This redundant practice has
drawn increasing criticism from the practicing bar.
Suggestion: The Company Law should be amended to provide that in-
corporators of a company (especially a foreign-owned LLC) should have
the right to select in the articles of incorporation either a board of directors
or the shareholders' meeting as the highest authority of the company.
43 See Company Law, art. 46.
44See Han, supra note 39, at 478.
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C. Board of Supervisors Under the Company Law: Merely Window
Dressing
Question: Can the board of supervisors of a LLC incorporated under
the Company Law effectively supervise the conduct of directors and man-
agers under the current structure of the Company Law?
The concept of a "board of supervisors" is not found in U.S. corporate
law. Such a notion, however, exists in other countries such as Germany.45
In China, a LLC incorporated under the Company Law with "large-scale"
business operations is required to establish a board of supervisors that con-
sists of no fewer than three supervisors. A LLC with a small number of
shareholders or a "small scale" of business may instead establish a board
with one or two supervisors.4 6
The board of supervisors should contain both shareholders' represen-
tatives and employees' elected representatives, the ratio of which should be
stated in the LLC's articles of incorporation.4 7 The Company Law provides
the board of supervisors with broad powers. The board may examine the
company's accounting records, and it may supervise the conduct of the di-
rectors or managers to prevent them from committing violations of law,
violations of the company's articles of incorporation, or engaging in con-
duct impairing the company's interest.48 Further, the board has the power
to call provisional shareholders' meeting and to attend meetings of the
board of directors.4 9
Several problems arise in practice with respect to the concept of a
board of supervisors. First, no statutory definition or meaningful guidance
was ever given by the government with regard to what constitutes a "large-
scale" or "small-scale" corporation, which leaves the determination solely
to the LLCs itself. Many LLCs prefer to have a sole supervisor, permitted
for small-scale businesses, because it allows LLCs to dispense with the
complicated employee election process.
Second, the Company Law provides no procedure by which the em-
ployees of a LLC elect their representatives to the board of supervisors. An
election is a very complicated, time-consuming, and expensive process. A
detailed procedure is necessary but so far deficient. As a consequence,
neither the State Council Securities Commission ("SCSC") nor the China
Securities Regulatory Committee ("CSRC") takes the enforcement of this
provision seriously in the context of Joint Stock Company Limited (Com-
45 For more discussion in this regard, see also Herbert Wiedemann, Codetermination By
Workers In German Enterprises, 28 AM. J. COMp. L. 79 (1980).46See Company Law, art. 52.47 See id.
48 See Company Law, art. 54.
49 See id.
Foreign Direct Investments in China
20:475 (2000)
pany Limited by Shares).50 Typically, corporations comply with this provi-
sion of the Company Law by electing members to the board of supervisors
at the shareholders' meeting. The CSRC allows this as long as one of the
supervisors is an employee other than a director, manager or officer in
charge of financial affairs. 51
The most critical problem is that the Company Law does not provide
for a board of supervisors that will necessarily be an effective check on the
activities of the directors and managers. Under the Company Law, the
board of supervisors possesses broad powers to monitor the conduct of di-
rectors and managers. However, as addressed above, the board of supervi-
sors is elected by the shareholders' meeting, which is run by a group of
controlling shareholders. Since the board of directors is also elected and
appointed by the same controlling shareholders, both the board of directors
and the board of supervisors may perceive themselves to be representatives
of the controlling shareholders. Thus, the supervisors may not be suffi-
ciently critical in their supervision of the activities of the directors and man-
agers. This lack of independence, together with the lack of operating
standards for fiduciary duties (see infra Part III, Heading B), makes the
board of supervisors merely a figurehead, and not a monitor in real sense.
Suggestion: Since the board of supervisors may not effectively per-
form an oversight function under the current structure of the law, it should
be eliminated from the Company Law and replaced by provisions that better
protect minority shareholders' interests.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE PROTECTION OF MINORITY
INTERESTS
A. Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests in the Company Law
Example: Upon the proposal of a majority shareholder controlling
80% of the registered capital, the shareholders' meeting of a LLC incorpo-
rated under the Company Law makes a resolution to merge with another
company that was also controlled by the same majority shareholder. The
20% minority shareholder strongly disagrees with the merger. Does the
minority shareholder have the legal right to stop the merger, or at least re-
cover the fair market value of its investment in the company? The answers
to both questions are negative.
5 The State Council Securities Commission ("SCSC") and its administrative entity,
China Securities Regulatory Committee ("CSRC"), are responsible for regulating and super-
vising China's Securities market.
5 1 Article 52 of the Company Law provides that directors, managers or other personnel in
charge of financial affairs may not serve as supervisors at the same time that they hold these
offices. Company Law, art. 52.
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This is only one illustration of how the Company Law lacks mecha-
nisms to protect minority shareholders' interests. In the U.S., minority
shareholders of LLCs have various means to protect their interests, such as
cumulative voting.52 A minority shareholder has the right to demand the
payment of a fair market value of its shares if it dissents from a decision to
merge, an exchange of shares, or an amendment to the articles of incorpo-
ration or bylaws.5 A minority shareholder also may bring a derivative law
suit on behalf of the corporation under certain circumstances.5 4 Moreover,
U.S. law recognizes the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders to mi-
nority shareholders upon certain transactions.
China's Company Law provides no effective measures to protect mi-
nority shareholder interests. The FIE laws, however, do a better job in this
regard. Under Article 33 of the ENV Implementation, the board of directors
(rather than the shareholders' meeting) is the highest authority of an EJV.
Directors are appointed by the investing parties in accordance with their ra-
tio of registered capital contributions. 5 - In the board meeting, the directors
vote by head (each has a single vote), not by the number of shares they rep-
resent (which is the case in a LLC's shareholders' meeting under the Com-
pany Law). The common practice is that minority shareholders are
generally allowed to appoint at least one member of the board, even though
the voting right of this director could possibly exceed the minority share-
holders' corresponding investment ratio.
Furthermore, under the EJV law, minority shareholders have veto
power over certain important matters. According to Article 36 of EJV law,
the following matters require the unanimous consent of all attending direc-
tors (providing that the meeting meets the two-third quorum requirement):
(1) modifications to an EJV's articles of incorporation, (2) termination or
dissolution of an EJV, (3) the increase or transfer of an EJV's registered
capital, and (4) mergers with other business organizations. This veto power
is crucial to protect the interests of minority shareholders.
By contrast, the Company Law gives no say at all to minority share-
holders. Under the Company Law, the shareholders' meeting is the highest
authority in a LLC and makes the final decisions about most important
52See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §7.28(b) (1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §618
(McKinney 2000).53See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §13.02(a)(1-4) (1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §910
(West 1999).
54See REv. Model Bus. Corp. Act §7.40 (1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §626 (West
1999).
55The typical cases involving controlling shareholders' fiduciary duty to minority share-
holders include Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (De. 1971), Perlman v. Feld-
mann, 219 F.2d 173 (2 nd Cir. 1995), and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (De. 1983).56See EJV Implementation, art. 34.
Foreign Direct Investments in China
20:475 (2000)
matters.5 7 For example, all the matters listed above as being determined by
the board of directors in an EJV are determined by the shareholders' meet-
ing in a LLC. 8 Moreover, shareholders in LLCs vote by the number of
shares they own.59 As a consequence, the majority shareholders would pre-
sumably exercise control over such matters as appointing the members of
board of directors and most of the board of supervisors, determining the
company's business policy and investment plan, and deciding the com-
pany's budget and profit distribution. 60
It is notable that the exercise of these powers by the shareholders'
meeting is mandatory, not optional, which means that even though the ma-
jority shareholders are willing to give up certain controls, they may not le-
gally do so. Furthermore, the Company Law does not recognize cumulative
voting as it exists in the United States, nor does the Company Law require
that minority shareholders have a minimum number of representatives on
the board of directors or board of supervisors.
Though Article 43 of the Company Law provides that shareholders
representing one-quarter of the voting rights in a corporation may initiate a
provisional shareholders' meeting, the lack of voting power these share-
holders possess makes this provision useless. The supervisory board does
not provide real protection for minority interests because, as discussed
above, the board functions merely as a figurehead. The directors' lack of
independence in their decision-making and the lack of standards of fiduci-
ary duty for directors make the protection of minority interests even harder.
Moreover, in contrast to U.S. laws, China has never recognized the fi-
duciary duty of controlling shareholders to minority shareholders. No pro-
vision in the Company Law or FIE laws restricts the controlling
shareholders' abilities to self-deal or engage in conflicting transactions
(which is in fact prevalent in China). Voting trusts and voting agreements
61
are not recognized and are unenforceable in China. Minority shareholders
cannot initiate derivative proceedings because such actions have never been
recognized either in law or in practice. The concept of dissenter's rights or
appraisal rights, recognized in U.S. law, 62 is unknown to most Chinese
judges. This lack of protections for minority shareholders has led many
companies in China to adopt a formal policy of never investing in minority
positions.
S7 Company Law, arts. 37, 38. This is also true in the context of Joint Stock Companies
Limited (Companies limited by shares). See Company Law, art. 102.58 See Company Law, art. 38.
59See Company Law, art. 41.
0 See Company Law, art. 38.
61See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§7.30, 7.31 (1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §621
(West 1999).
62 See generally REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§13.01-13.31(1984) (Chapter 13 dis-
cusses dissenters' rights).
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Suggestion: The Company Law should be amended to give more vot-
ing power to minority shareholders in shareholders' meetings and guarantee
minority shareholders a minimum number of seats on the board of directors.
Dissenters' rights, the right to initiate derivative lawsuits, and the fiduciary
duties of the controlling shareholders to minority shareholders should be
recognized in both the Company Law and FIE laws.
B. Lack of Operating Standard for Fiduciary Duties
Example: The board of directors of an EJV engaged in the beer brew-
ing business is convening to discuss the feasibility of entering the local soft-
drink market (which is highly profitable and less competitive) by merging
with a promising soft-drink company. While he realizes that such a plan is
in the best interests of the EV, one of the directors objects to the merger
plan in the fear that the merger would impair his personal soft-drink busi-
ness, which is a major competitor of the target company. The merger plan
is suspended due to the veto. May a shareholder sue the vetoing director for
breach of fiduciary duty? The answer is that it would be very difficult to
prevail in such a suit.
U.S. law generally recognizes directors' and officers' fiduciary duties
to the corporation and shareholders. In observing their fiduciary duties, the
directors and shareholders must comply with the "business judgment rule,"
i.e., they must act in good faith, with the care an ordinary prudent person in
a like position would exercise under similar situations, and in a manner they
reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation.63 China's
Company Law also imposes fiduciary duties on directors, supervisors and
managers of LLCs in Articles 59 through 63.6 Generally, these provisions
may be divided into two categories.
The first category seems simply to reiterate provisions of the criminal
law. Article 59 prohibits directors, supervisors, and managers from ac-
cepting bribes. Article 60 prohibits directors, supervisors, and managers
from embezzling company funds. Article 62 prohibits directors, supervi-
sors, and managers from disclosing a company's commercial secrets with-
out proper authorization. These provisions were absolutely necessary at the
time the Company Law was enacted because of an obvious loophole in
China's criminal law. At that time, the provisions of criminal law forbid-
ding bribery and embezzlement only applied to state employees, 65 i.e., the
employees of the government, state-owned enterprises and collectively-
63 See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §8.42(a)(1-3) (1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§717,
715(h) (West 1999).
6 Similar provisions exist in context of Joint Stock Company limited.65See CRIMINAL LAw OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1979) (ZhongHua RenMin
GongHeGuo XingFa (1979)) arts. 126, 155, 185 (PRC) [hereinafter "1979 Criminal Law"].
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owned enterprises, but not employees in the private business sector.6 The
above provisions in the Company Law are apparently intended to close this
loophole.
The second category concerns fiduciary duties in the real sense. Arti-
cle 59 requires that directors, supervisors, and managers abide by the com-
pany's articles of incorporation, protect the company's interests, and
perform their duties with loyalty and honesty. Article 59 further prohibits
such officers from exploiting their positions in the company to advance
their personal interests. Article 60 prohibits directors, supervisors, and
managers from providing personal guaranties with the company's assets.
Article 61 states that directors, supervisors, and managers may not, on their
behalf or on behalf of others, engage in the same line of business as the
company, and may not conduct transactions with the company unless the
company's articles provide otherwise or the shareholders' meeting approves
the transaction. Article 63 requires directors, supervisors, and managers to
compensate the company for damages caused by any conduct they engage
in that violates the laws or articles of the company. Moreover, under Arti-
cle 40 of the EJV Implementation, general managers and vice general man-
agers may not take the same positions in other business organizations, and
may not participate in commercial competition with the company on behalf
of other organizations.
These provisions reflect the well-intended efforts of China to establish
fiduciary duties for company officers. Nonetheless, a serious problem ex-
ists regarding the practicability of these provisions. Like all Chinese laws,
these provisions are too skeletal and lack operating standards. For example,
Article 59 provides that "directors, supervisors, and managers should per-
form their duties with loyalty and honesty." But what is the standard of
"loyalty" or "honesty"? The law provided no operating standards. Direc-
tors, supervisors, and managers in China, unlike their U.S. counterparts,
have no "business judgment rule" on which to rely or with which to protect
themselves.
Furthermore, a lot of murky areas have been left unilluminated by the
Company Law. For example, Article 63 of the Company Law requires di-
rectors, supervisors, and managers to compensate the company for damages
caused by action undertaken in violation of the laws or articles of incorpo-
ration of the company. But the law fails to set out the responsibilities of
those officers, or establish any penalties for an officer who acts in bad faith,
or fails to act in the best interest of the company without violating the letter
of the company's laws or articles of incorporation.
66This loophole was resolved by the promulgation of new NPC legislation in 1995 and
1997. See CRIMINAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1997) (ZhongHua RenMin
GongHeGuo XingFa (1997)) (promulgated on Oct. 1, 1997) arts. 271, 272 (PRC) [hereinaf-
ter "1997 Criminal Law"]. (The 1979 Criminal Law was replaced by the 1997 Criminal
Law. The 1997 Criminal Law is the current Law of China).
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The direct consequence of lack of operating standards is that directors,
supervisors, and managers can only act based on their own subjective
judgment, or at the direction of the shareholders who appoint them. In fact,
directors, supervisors, and managers in China tend to perceive themselves
as representatives of the shareholders who appoint them and thus act in the
best interest of such shareholders, rather than in the best interest of the
company.
For majority shareholders, the only practical remedy when an officer
disobeys their orders is to replace the delinquent officer because of the lack
of standards for their conduct. Without definitive standards, initiating suits
against the delinquent officers is likely to be protracted and unpromising.
For minority shareholders, there is no remedy at all because, as discussed
earlier, they have no say in the company's management.
Notwithstanding the letter of the law, the SAIC does not strictly en-
force the provisions regarding the fiduciary duties of company officers. It
is very common in China for an officer to engage in the same line business
as the company for which he acts as an officer, and conduct transactions
with the company without the approval of either the articles of incorpora-
tion or the shareholders' meeting. It is also common for the general man-
agers or vice general managers of EJVs to hold the same positions in more
than one company and sometimes even compete with their company on be-
half of other companies.
Suggestion: A clear standard of fiduciary duties for directors, manag-
ers, and supervisors should be set forth in the Company Law and FIE laws.
IV. RESOLVING DEADLOCK
Example: X company, an EYV in China, has two shareholders: Mr. Li,
who holds 60% of the registered capital and has the right to appoint three
members to the board of directors, and Mr. Kwan, who holds 40% of the
registered capital and has the right to appoint two members to the board.
Mr. Kwan instructed his appointed directors not to attend the annual board
meeting in retaliation for Mr. Li's refusal to give Mr. Kwan a say in the
management and because Mr. Li's refused to approve Mr. Kwan's plan to
transfer his shareholdings to a third party last year. Consequentially, X
company's board meeting could not be legally held because it failed to meet
the two-thirds quorum requirement, and therefore X company could not
obtain loans to maintain its operation without the board's resolution (re-
quired by all banks in China). Could Mr. Li unilaterally petition to dissolve
the company under this situation? Answer: Such a petition is very unlikely
to be successful.
U.S. law confers on shareholders the right to petition for a judicial dis-
solution of a corporation under certain circumstances, such as when the
management of the corporation is deadlocked; if the directors act in a ille-
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gal, oppressive, or fraudulent manner; or if the corporate assets are being
misapplied or wasted.67 By contrast, insufficient mechanisms are provided
in China's Company Law and FIE laws to resolve potential deadlocks and
shareholders' oppressions. Such deadlocks frequently occur when share-
holders fail to or refuse to cooperate with other shareholders, making the
operation of a LLC or ETV impossible, or when one shareholder would like
to transfer its shares and other shareholders block the transfer.
A. Shareholders' Failure or Refusal to Cooperate
Failure or refusal by some shareholders to cooperate in some important
matters of a LLC or EJV is prevalent in China. This is especially true in
LLCs when the controlling shareholder controls the management and op-
eration of the company and refuses to give the minority shareholders a say.
For example, under Article 43 of the Company Law, minority shareholders
representing one-quarter of the voting rights in a company may propose a
provisional shareholders' meeting. This meeting should be called by the
board of directors upon receiving notice from the minority shareholders.
If the board, probably dominated by the controlling shareholder, ex-
pressly refuses to call the meeting, the minority shareholders may enforce
their statutory rights in court. But if the board of directors simply fails to
respond to the minority shareholders' notice, or after agreeing to call the
meeting delays in providing notice of the date and venue of the meeting, the
minority shareholders would likely have a difficult time enforcing their
rights in court. Generally, courts in China are reluctant to hear cases like
this where no clear statutory rights are violated.
Another typical situation arises from the special provision of EJV law.
Under Article 35 of the EJV Implementation, a board of directors meeting
(both annual and provisional) may be held only if two-thirds of the directors
attend. A problem arises when some directors fail or refuse to attend the
meeting and their absence causes the meeting fail to satisfy the two-thirds
quorum requirement. Since the board of directors is the highest authority of
an EJV and makes all the major decisions about the operation of the EV,
the inability of board to convene would seriously disable the company, and
sometimes even render the EJV "dead." The EJV law provides no remedy
for an aggrieved party in this situation.
B. Deadlock in the Context of Share Transfers
Under Article 23 of the EJV Implementation, if one party of an EJV
would like to transfer all or part of its capital contribution to a third party
67See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 14.30 (1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §1 104 (West
1999).
68 See Company Law, art. 43 (Where a limited liability company established the board of
directors, the shareholders' meetings shall be called by the board of directors....)
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(other than current shareholders of the EJV), the unanimous consent of all
attending directors and all shareholders is required.68 If one party objects to
the transfer, then presumably the transfer should fail. The EJV law fails to
contemplate the situation in which, instead of objecting, the non-
transferring party simply fails to respond to the transferring party's notice.
Should the transferring party wait indefinitely for the consent? Bear in
mind that under the structure of ENV law, the board of directors is the high-
est authority, 70 and neither the shareholders nor the shareholders' meeting
qualifies as an organ of the EV. Thus, a shareholder has no means to re-
quire or compel another party to response to its notice under the EV law.
Possibly contemplating this situation, the Company Law addresses the
transfer of shareholders' shares in more detail. Under the Company Law,
shareholders may transfer to each other all or some of their shares without
the consent of the shareholders' meeting or of other shareholders.71 If a
shareholder would like to transfer its shares to an outsider, the consent of a
majority of shareholders is required.72  If such majority consent cannot be
obtained, the shareholders who did not consent to the transfer must pur-
chase the shares in question.73
Still, several problems arise with regard to the practicality of this pro-
vision. First, under what price and conditions should the dissenting share-
holders purchase the shares in question? What if the dissenting
shareholders agree to purchase the shares, but only at a lower price? The
Company Law is silent about whether the dissenting shareholders should
purchase the shares at the same price and conditions as those given by the
outside purchaser, which is the requirement for shareholders to exert their
preemptive right.74 Consequently, the dilemma for the transferring share-
holders could be either selling their shares to an insider in a lower price, or
keeping them.
The second problem is that the Company Law fails to address a situa-
tion in which more than one shareholder dissents. How many shares should
each dissenter purchase in this situation? Should they purchase the shares
in equal portions, or pro rata, i.e., in the same ratio as their capital contribu-
tions? What if the dissenting shareholders fail to agree on how many shares
each should purchase? Is it fair for the transferring party to wait indefi-
nitely for them to negotiate and reach agreements?
69The EJV Law is silent with regard to whether such consents are still required if the
transfer is made to one of the parties of the EJV. In practice, the SAIC imposes the same re-
quirements (i.e. consents of all non-transacting parties) on such transfers as those to a third
party. See EJV Implementation, art. 33
7 0See EJV Implementation, art. 33.
71 Company Law, art. 35.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74See id.; EJV Implementation, art. 23.
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C. Shareholders' Right of Dissolution
May an aggrieved party, under the deadlock situations discussed
above, petition for a unilateral dissolution before the relevant administrative
or judicial branch? In this situation, courts in China would likely dismiss
the case by simply saying that no clear statutory right is violated and that
there is no statutory provision for courts to enforce. The right of involun-
tary dissolution in China may only be asserted by creditors of a company.75
Under limited circumstances, an EJV (not a shareholder) may petition
the dissolution of itself before the MOFTEC. Those circumstances include:
(1) when the term of an EV expires, (2) when an EV incurs heavy losses
and is unable to continue its operation, (3) when a party to an EV agree-
ment, contract, or articles of incorporation fails to perform its obligations,
making it impossible for the EV to continue its operations, (4) when an
EJV incurs heavy losses due to an act of god (such as a natural disaster or
war) and is unable to continue its operation, (5) when an EN fails to ac-
complish its operating goal and has no future for further developments, and
(6) when other reasons for dissolution provided in the EN- contracts or arti-
cles of incorporation arise.76
However, all of these situations except the expiration of EN terms re-
quire that the board of directors of the EV submit a resolution of dissolu-
tion to MOFTEC.77 If, as discussed above, deadlock has occurred and
convening the board of directors is impossible, a "dissolution resolution"
may not be legally submitted in the name of the board of directors.
A shareholder's right to petition a unilateral dissolution upon a dead-
lock is not generally recognized in either the Company Law or FIE laws.
However, according to a rule jointly promulgated by the SAIC and
MOFTEC, there is one limited exception to the rule. That is, if one party of
an EJV fails to fully contribute the registered capital required under the EV
contracts and is unable to do so within one month after the observing
party's admonition, the observing party may unilaterally petition the disso-
lution of the EJV.78 Obviously, this unilateral dissolution can occur only in
very limited situations and cannot apply to deadlocks occurring after parties
have fully contributed their shares in registered capital.
Suggestion: Detailed provisions regarding how to resolve deadlocks
should be set forth in the Company Law and FIE laws, and a shareholder's
75See CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (ZhongHua RenMin
GongHeGuo MinShi SuSongFa) (promulgated on Apr. 9, 1991) art. 199 (PRC).76 See EJV Implementation, art. 102.
77 See id.
78See RULES ON CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PARTIES OF CHINESE-FOREIGN EQUITY
JOINT VENTURES (GuanYu ZhongWai HeZi JingYing QiYe TouZi GeFang ChuZi De
GuiDing) (Promulgated jointly by MOFTEC and SAIC on Jan. 1, 1988) art. 7 (PRC) [here-
inafter "Rules on Capital Contributions"].
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right to petition a unilateral judicial or administrative dissolution of the
company should be recognized in both the Company Law and FIE laws.
V. INFLEXIBLE RESTRICTIONS
A. Limited Business Purpose: A Mandatory Requirement for Incorporation
Example: X company is an EJV in China with a registered business
purpose of manufacturing and selling beer. Since the soft drink market is
more profitable and X company may utilize its current equipment to pro-
duce soft drinks, the shareholders and board of directors issued a resolution
to enter the soft drink market, and amended its articles of incorporation ac-
cordingly. However, it failed to change its registered business purpose in
the filings of the SAIC and MOFTEC. Can X company produce and sell
soft drinks? Answer: Not yet.
Once a company or FIE is incorporated in China, it may only engage in
the activities set forth in its business license and articles of incorporation.
79
This is also the case in the United States.80 There are, however, sharp dif-
ferences between the U.S. and Chinese laws. In the U.S., a selected busi-
ness purpose is not a mandatory requirement for incorporation and a
company may engage in "any lawful business," unless a more limited pur-
pose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.81 In China, a limited busi-
ness purpose (the literal translation is "scope of business") must be selected
at the time of incorporation. A broad statement intended to include all law-
ful business is not allowed as a matter of fact, although it is not expressly
prohibited as a matter of law.
As a consequence of this mandatory requirement, a company or FIE is
considered legally incompetent or unqualified to conduct activities outside
its business purpose. All contracts and transactions that go beyond the
scope of a company's business purpose are void per se.83 Courts in China,
however, have often found it difficult to determine whether the content of a
contract is within or beyond the scope of a company's business purpose.
This mandatory limited business purpose requirement is one of the in-
dications of the major transition that China's laws are undergoing. No le-
gitimate justification except the residue of the planned economic system
could explain this requirement. In the planned economic period, a factory
79See Civil Law, art. 42; See Company Law, art. 11.
80See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §3.01 (1984); N.Y Bus. CORP. LAW §201(a) (West
1999).
8t See REv. MODEL Bus. CORP, AcT §§2.02(b), 3.01 (1984); N.Y Bus. CORP. LAW §§
20 1(a), 202(16) (West 1999).
83 However, in recent years, courts in China have been reluctant to invalidate contracts
merely because the contracts go beyond the business purpose of one of the contracting par-
ties. But thus far, there has been no substantive change in the law regarding this matter.
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or company only functioned as a unit of a bigger system, and therefore only
specialized in a very narrow area. A company was required to play its as-
signed role in the system rather than to pursue profits. But in a market-
oriented economic system, this rigid requirement not only produces enor-
mous uncertainty in business transactions and impedes companies' auton-
omy of contracts, it also affects a company's ability to pursue the goal of
maximum profits.
If the business purpose of a company or FIE is "direct investment," or
in other words if the prospective company is intended to be incorporated as
an "investment company" or "holding company," some special rules apply.
Otherwise, the cumulative direct investments of a non-investment company
may not exceed 50% of its "net assets" (equity).8 4 However, in practice,
there is no effective mechanism for the government to monitor the invest-
ment activities of LLCs so as to ensure compliance with this requirement of
the Company Law.
Suggestion: All relevant legal provisions regarding the mandatory
limited business purpose ought to be abolished, or the requirement should
become optional at the time of incorporation.
B. Legal Representative: An Unjustified Statutory Authorization
Example: An EJV is near the closing of a deal to purchase expensive
equipment. However, the president of the EJV's board, as its legal repre-
sentative, disagreed with the rest of the board of directors with regard to
both the quality and the price of the equipment. In spite of his dissent, the
board of directors made a resolution to purchase the equipment and author-
ize the vice president to close the deal on behalf of the EJV. Assuming the
convening of the meeting and the resolution of the board of directors meets
the requirements of the law, can the vice president legally represent the EJV
with the authorization of the board? Answer: The vice-president cannot do
so without the authorization of the legal representative.
In the United States, any duly authorized director or officer of a corpo-
ration may act on behalf of the corporation.8 5 Such authority may be ex-
84 Those detailed rules include the approval of State Council for domestic companies (no
foreign investment involved) and approval of MOFTEC if foreign investments are involved.
See Company Law, art. 12; PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS OF THE PRC ON INVESTMENT
COMPANIES ESTABLISHED BY FOREIGN INVESTORS (GuanYu WaiShang TouZi JuBan
TouZiXing GongSi De ZanXing GuiDing) art. 3 (PRC) [hereinafter "Provisional Regula-
tions of the PRC on Investment Companies"]. Also, for a FIE investment company, the reg-
istered capital should be more than U.S.$30 million or its equivalent. See Provisional
Regulations of the PRC on Investment Companies, art. 2 Moreover, the foreign party must
meet some other requirements, such as possessing certain amount of assets. See id.
85 See REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §8.41 (1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. : LAW §715(g) (West
1999).
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press, implied, or apparent.86 In China, only the "legal representative" of a
business may act on behalf of the business.
The "legal representative" in China is a civil-law concept with Chinese
characteristics. In China, a legal representative is a natural person author-
ized by the law (not by the board of directors or shareholders' meeting) to
act on behalf of and bind the company. 7 The legal representative of a LLC
or FIE is the president of the board of directors, and in a small-scale LLC
choosing not to have a board, it is the executive director.88
The legal implications of this unique concept are twofold. First, the
statutory authorization of a legal representative is absolute and not subject
to the power of the shareholders' meetings or board of directors. In order to
be a legal representative, a person must first be elected or appointed as
president of the board of directors, and then be approved by the SAIC,
which registers and prints that person's name on the company's business li-
cense. Once these requirements are met, the legal representative would
bind the company by any transaction he or she conducts on behalf of the
LLC without the need of any further authorization.
The power of the legal representative is absolute in the sense that such
power is authorized by the law and the power to bind the company is not
subject to any limitation set by the articles of incorporation, resolutions of
shareholders' meetings, or board of directors.89 For example, if the share-
holders and board of directors pass a resolution prohibiting the legal repre-
sentative from conducting certain transactions and the legal representative
proceeds regardless of such resolution, the company is still bound by the
transaction (although the shareholders may have a cause of action against
the legal representative personally). 90 Thus, the only way for shareholders
to abridge a legal representative's absolute statutory authority is to deprive
him or her of the status of legal representative by changing the registration
at the SAIC.91
The second legal implication is that a legal representative's statutory
authorization is exclusive. The legal representative is the only person who
may represent the company in conducting business activities, and all activi-
ties conducted by other officers without the authorization of the legal repre-
86 See LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 267 (4th ed. 1997).
97 See Civil Law, arts. 38, 43.
8 8See Company Law, art. 45; EN Implementation, art. 37.
8 9See Civil Law, art. 43; A company may be bound even if the legal representative acts
without proper authorization. See CONTRACT LAW OF THE PRC (ZhongHua RenMin Gong-
HeGuo HeTongFa) (promulgated on March 16, 1999) art. 50 (PRC).
90 See Civil Law, art. 49.
91See Regulation for Legal Persons, art. 7; Civil Law, art. 38.
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sentative are presumably void.92 In other words, the legal representative is
the only officer of a company with the "inherent authority" to act for the
company. All business must be carried out through the legal representative
or his or her authorized agents, even if it concerns a matter requiring the
resolution of shareholders' meeting or board of directors under the articles
of incorporation. 93 The flip side of this legal implication is that officers
other than the legal representative, even those ranking as high as a director
or general manager, and even if they have been authorized by the directors
or shareholders, may not conduct business on behalf of the company with-
out authorization from the legal representative.
This absolute and exclusive authorization of legal representative is
unjustified under the basic principles of the Company Law. China recog-
nizes "equal share, equal right" as the basic principle regarding the exercise
and distribution of shareholders' power.94 However, the absolute and ex-
clusive power of a legal representative gives a huge advantage to the share-
holder who has the ability to control the election or appointment of the legal
representative. Such an advantage, as a practical matter, potentially gives
one shareholder superior rights to another regardless of the number of
shares she or he holds.
A look at recent history might make it more understandable why such a
concept is embedded in the modem company law of China. The legal rep-
resentative under the Company Law may trace its origins to the concept of
the wholly State-Owned Enterprise ("SOE"), a structure that has no prob-
lem with unequal shareholders' rights because the state is the sole owner.
In a traditional SOE (without the mechanism of the shareholders' meeting
or board of directors), 95 the state is the highest authority in the enterprise.
However, because the state has no ability to conduct the day-to-day man-
agement of the business, a legal representative is appointed and vested with
both authorities and liabilities.
In the context of SOEs, the legal representative system does play some
positive roles, both in the management of the SOEs and the preservation of
state assets. However, such roles are very doubtful when the authority in a
company changes from the state, which has no ability to conduct day-to-day
92See Civil Law, art. 38 ("...[T]he responsible person who acts on behalf of the legal per-
son in exercising its functions and powers shall be its legal representative"). However, the
authorization need not necessarily be express. It may be inferred from the course of dealing
or course of performance. For example, periodical office supply contracts conducted by
lower officers of a company could be legally recognized.
9' See id.
94 See infra note 108.
9sThis is still the typical situation for the majority of SOEs. A traditional SOE may be
standardized into a wholly state-owned company ("WSOC") under the Company Law.
However, no legal significance was added by such standardization. The SOE is already, as a
practical matter, a limited liability company prior to the standardization.
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management, to a board of directors, whose function purports to be just
that.
While enjoying absolute and exclusive powers, the legal representative
does bear greater risks than other directors and officers of a LLC. The legal
representative may be subject to administrative penalties or even criminal
prosecution if the company engages in business beyond its authorized busi-
ness purpose, conceals material facts from registration or tax authorities, or
hides properties in order to evade debts, regardless of whether the legal rep-
resentative has personally participated or authorized such activities.
9
Moreover, a person may be disqualified from being a legal representa-
tive in other organizations if he or she is the legal representative of a com-
pany whose business license has been revoked within the past three years
and the legal representative was held personally liable for the conduct
causing the license to be revoked . No enlightening definition is found in
the Company Law about what constitutes "personal liability." Also, it is
doubtful that the legal representative of a LLC under the Company Law,
who possibly lacks a say in the shareholders' meetings and in decisions
about important company matters, should fairly bear such a responsibility.
However formidable these provisions, the SAIC has not been serious in
enforcing them and does not trace the records of legal representatives or
other high-level company officers. Also, the legislative trend in China is to
dilute the concept of legal representative, and in recent legislation, it has
been replaced by terms such as "responsible person" or "directly responsi-
ble person."9'
Suggestion: The legal-representative system ought to be abolished in
China. Any duly authorized officer should be able to represent a company
legally.
C. Registered Capital: A Misleading Illusion
Example: Two LLCs, A and B, engaged in the same line of business
and newly incorporated under the Company Law, have registered capital of
10 million and 1 million cash, respectively. Is Company A more credit-
worthy than Company B for a 1 million dollar purchase of equipment? An-
swer: Not necessarily.
Registered capital is a mandatory requirement for the registration of a
LLC under both the Company Law and FIE laws. 99 The shareholders are
liable for the LLC's debts only to the extent of their agreed capital contri-
96 See Civil Law, art. 49.
97 See Company Law, art. 57.
98 See Company Law, arts. 212, 213.
99Company Law, art. 22; EJV Implementation, arts. 12, 14, 16. See also Company Law,
art. 23 (setting forth minimum requirements of registered capital for LLCs engaged in differ-
ent lines of business).
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butions in the registered capital.'0° For a LLC under the Company Law, the
registered capital must be actually and fully contributed to the account of
the LLC before the SAIC issues the requisite registration.10 1 This require-
ment distinguishes China's "registered capital" from "stated capital" under
U.S. law, which is not required to be actually paid by shareholders to the
corporation at the time of registration.
Under the EJV law, the contribution requirement of registered capital
is more liberal. The parties have six months to contribute their registered
capital and may have an additional one month to do so after the six months
expires without substantially affecting their rights under the EJV con-
tracts. 10 2 Although the SAIC exercises close supervision to make sure that
LLCs have genuinely contributed their registered capital, a large number of
companies still successfully circumvent the law, which sometimes makes
the registered capital only an illusion to creditors.
One way to circumvent the law is to obtain a false "Certificate of
Capital Contribution Examination." Under both Company Law and EJV
law, a company must submit to the SAIC a "Certificate of Capital Contri-
bution Examination" (the "certificate") to verify its actual capital contribu-
tion. The certificate should be issued by a qualified accounting
institution.'0 3 However, due to relaxed professional discipline and govern-
ment oversight, some accounting institutions issue certificates for a fee
without actually examining the clients' bank records. As a result, a certifi-
cate may be obtained even if an investor does not have a penny in its ac-
count.
The second way to circumvent the law is to withdraw the registered
capital after obtaining a certificate. In spite of the prohibition that the
shareholders of a LLC may not withdraw their capital contributions after
the registration of the company, ' 4 it is a common practice in China that in-
vestors withdraw their investments and leave the company to rely on loans
or other sources. Some investors even withdraw their capital contributions
prior to the registration soon after they acquire a certificate from an ac-
counting institution. Even though the withdrawing shareholders are still le-
gally liable to the creditors of the company, the typical situation is that such
shareholder is insolvent, or acquires his or her own registration by the very
same practice.'05 Therefore, the creditors may suffer losses from relying on
the illusory registered capital.
'GoSee Company Law, art. 3; EJV Law, art. 4.
1o1 See Company Law, art. 27.
1 2 See Rules on Capital Contributions, art. 24.
103 Company Law, art. 26.
104 Company Law, art. 34.
105 Generally, the shareholders conducting this kind of practice would not be subject to
criminal fraud prosecution. Currently, more and more Chinese companies and creditors
choose to conduct only secured transactions.
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To make this situation worse, the SAIC does not seriously enforce the
administrative and criminal penalties related to withdrawal of the registered
capital or false representations about the registered capital. In fact, some
state employees in local branches of the SAIC engage in the lucrative
"business" of helping investors to obtain false certificates. All the forego-
ing situations leave innocent creditors unprotected and to some extent affect
the creditability and reputation of China's LLCs as a whole.
Suggestion: Strict enforcement of relevant laws regarding the regis-
tered capital should be stressed. Another alternative is to eliminate from
both the Company Law and FEE laws the "actual contribution" requirement
regarding registered capital.
D. Limitation on Shareholders' Right to Distribute Profits
Example: X Company, a LLC incorporated under the Company Law,
made a substantial profit in its first year of operation by manufacturing and
selling beer. After paying all the taxes required by law, the shareholders'
meeting made a resolution distributing all the after-tax profit to sharehold-
ers. Can X Company do this? Answer: Not yet.
Under both the Company Law and FIE laws, profits may not be dis-
tributed until all previous losses have been paid up by the company10 6 In
other words, the distribution of profits is allowed only if the company has
"accumulated retained earnings." This is essentially an "earned surplus
test" similar to § 45 of the U.S. Model Business Corporation Act (1969).




The basic principle regarding the profit distribution is that "equal shares re-
ceive equal profits,"10 and the distribution of profits is made in accordance
with the percentage of shareholders' capital distribution in the registered
106 Company Law, art. 177; EJV Implementation, art. 88.
107See Company Law, arts. 178, 179.
108 This is thus a Joint Stock Company Limited (Company Limited by Shares). Company
Law, art. 130.
The provisions regarding LLCs are silent on this matter. However, it is a practical prin-
ciple for LLCs. One misunderstanding regarding this provision is that in China, the "per-
centage of capital contributions" is thought to be a different concept from the "percentage of
shareholdings." But in fact, they are virtually the same, providing that all shareholders actu-
ally and fully contribute their shares in registered capital. As a matter of law, for Companies
Limited by Shares and as a matter of fact for LLCs, all shares must be sold at the same price
at the time of issuance. Company Law, art. 133. Therefore, a party contributing the same
capital contribution will receive the same number of shares as any other parties contributing
the same capital contribution. After the registration of a company, a premium may be paid
by a purchaser to a shareholder to purchase their existing shares in the company. However,
for this latter situation, the company will recognize that the number of shares that the pur-
chaser bought is the same as the number of shares that the seller sold, even though the pur-
chaser may have paid a higher price for the same shares.
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capital (assuming that all shareholders have actually and fully contributed
their shares in the registered capital)."0 9
The Company Law is silent as to whether a company may issue differ-
ent classes of stocks with different voting and dividend rights. Presumably,
this is not allowed because the Company law provides that in the context of
Joint Stock Company Limited (Companies Limited by Shares), the com-
pany must issue stocks under the principles of "equal share, equal right,"
"equal share, equal profit," and "equal share, equal price."110
Although the Company Law essentially adopted an "earned surplus"
test, subtle differences exist between China's law and U.S. law. In the
United States, all profits satisfying this "test" may be distributed in any
manner the corporation wishes. In China, however, company is required to
allocate a certain percentage of its after-tax profits into certain mandatory
funds before distributing profits.
Under the Company Law, a company must place ten percent of its af-
ter-tax profits into a "mandatory accumulated fund," and five to ten percent
into a "mandatory public welfare fund." These two funds are commonly re-
ferred to as the "double funds requirement."'' Under EJV law, allocations
must be made to a "reservation fund," an "employee bonus and welfare
fund," and an "enterprise development fund" (with their percentages de-
cided by the board of directors!112
The "mandatory accumulated fund" may be used to pay the company's
losses or increase the company's production, or may be converted into reg-
istered capital.' 13 A company may suspend the allocation of this fund if the
total accumulated funds equals 50% of the company's registered capital.
The "mandatory public welfare fund" should be used to promote the collec-
tive welfare of the company's employees'
1 4
The so-called "double funds" originates from similar concepts in state-
owned enterprises. In state-owned enterprises, the state employees and the
state-appointed managers directly in charge of the enterprise tend to engage
in short-term practices that are beneficial to their personal promotion but
are not in the long-term interest of the enterprise and its employees. To
remedy this problem, the state, by law, required state-owned enterprises to
contribute to the mandatory double funds.
Although the double funds may play a positive role in state-owned en-
terprises, this concept is surely out of date in the context of the modem
LLC. Here, the ownership of a company is clear and unambiguous; only
109 See Company Law, arts. 33, 177.
10 See Company Law, art. 130.
1 See Company Lav, art. 177.
112 See EJV Implementation, art. 87.
13 See Company Law, art. 179.
114 See Company Law, art. 180.
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the owners (shareholders) and its representatives (board of directors) have a
say in deciding what is in the best interest of the company. The mandatory
double funds interfere with shareholders' autonomy regarding profit distri-
bution, reinvestment, and repatriation of their investment. As a conse-
quence, a company's shareholders have to leave their profits (amounting to
up to 50% of the registered capital) in the company, even though the busi-
ness is unpromising and not worth additional investment. The company has
to contribute to the "mandatory public welfare fund" every year it has prof-
its, even if it had already provided competitive wages and benefits to its
employees. 115
Suggestion: The double-funds requirement should be abolished from
both the Company Law and FIE laws.
E. Restrictions on FIEs' Ability to Establish Wholly-Owned LLCs
Example: X company is a wholly foreign-owned enterprise ("WFOE")
in China with a limited-liability feature incorporated by a multi-national
corporation several years ago. Due to its increasing business, X company
would like to incorporate subsidiaries in all major cities in China, and
would like the subsidiaries to maintain the limited-liability feature. Moreo-
ver, X company wants to incorporate all the subsidiaries using its own
funds (which is also the policy of the multi-national corporation) so that it
need not deal with other shareholders. Can X company do carry out this
plan? The answer is no; X company must find at least one other investor in
order to incorporate a LLC.
Chinese laws treat Chinese and foreigners unequally, or more accu-
rately, treat Chinese nationals and legal persons, including those established
by foreign investors, less favorably in terms of the establishment of enter-
prises and income taxes than foreign investors coming directly from abroad.
If the justification for the preferential tax treatment is to attract more foreign
investment to China, it is hard to conceive of any legitimate reason not to
grant Chinese nationals and legal persons the same rights as to the estab-
lishment of enterprises. This is because foreign investments may not neces-
sarily benefit from, or may even be harmed by, such discrimination against
Chinese nationals and legal persons.
According to Article 2 of the WFOE law, a foreign investor directly
coming from a foreign country may establish a wholly-owned foreign en-
terprise in China as a sole shareholder, and this enterprise may be granted
the status of legal person. 1 6 The term "investor" includes both legal and
15 The Company Law is silent regarding how to dispose this fund upon a company's dis-
solution.
16 See WFOE Law, art. 8.
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natural persons. 17 Moreover, investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Tai-
wan are also treated as "foreigners" for the purpose of FIE laws.'18
For a Chinese national or enterprise to establish a subsidiary enterprise
with a legal-person status (so as to enjoy the advantage of limited-liability),
however, at least two shareholders are required, even though another share-
holder's shareholdings may be negligible.1 9 This is even true when an FIE
would like to further incorporate subsidiaries in China. Otherwise, the sole
investor of a "private enterprise" has unlimited personal liability with re-
spect to the debts of the enterprise.1
20
No official legislative explanation has ever been disclosed for this une-
qual treatment One speculation in legal circles is that the NPC suspects
that Chinese nationals or companies mighty misuse the limited liability
feature to commit fraud. For a short time after China implemented its open
door policy, "Co." and "Ltd." were used by some unscrupulous Chinese
business owners to commit fraud because in the planned economic period,
companies designated "Co." and "Ltd." were all owned by the State and
were therefore symbols of trustworthiness. But this is surely no longer the
case since China began implementing an open-door policy. However, more
preventive measures in the law and more stringent law enforcement would
be more effective than this unjustified bright-line prohibition in terms of the
deterrence of fraud.
On the other hand, if the NPC believed that one-person companies are
inherently untrustworthy, there is no reason to limit this rule to Chinese na-
tionals or companies, since no evidence indicates that foreign investors are
more creditworthy than Chinese investors, or that all investors coming from
foreign countries are more trustworthy than subsidiaries established by for-
eign investors in China. In fact, investment fraud committed by small in-
vestors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan became so prevalent in China
in the 1980s that some leading party members became hostile toward small
117 See WFOE Law, art. 1.
"1
8 See REGULATIONS OF STATE COUNCIL FOR ENCOURAGING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS (1986)
art. 39 (PRC).
119 The Company Law fails to specify the minimum percentage of minority shareholders'
capital contribution in the registered capital. The practical standard adopted by some SAIC
local offices is 2%. Company Law, art. 20.
120 See Provisional Regulation On Private Enterprises, arts. 7, 9 (The limited liability
companies shall have more than two but no more than 30 investors). The legal distinction
between the private enterprise and the sole proprietorship is whether eight or more employ-
ees are employed. See Provisional Regulation On Private Enterprises, art. 2. If eight or
more are employed, then it is a private enterprise; otherwise, it is a sole proprietorship. Dif-
ferent laws with regard to application procedures, capital requirements and tax consequences
apply for private enterprises and sole proprietorships. There is no privately-owned one-
shareholder corporation with LLC status in China. See LAW OF WHOLLY INDIVIDUAL OWNED
ENTERPRSiEs OF THE PRC (ZhongHua RenMin GongHeGuo GeRen DuZi QiYeFa) (passed
on August 30, 1999, effective Jan. 1, 2000) art. 2 (PRC); Company Law, art. 13 (A company
is responsible for the civil liability of its branch company).
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investors from these areas. Typical frauds committed by these foreign in-
vestors included withdrawing or delaying capital investment in EJVs while
sharing the profit as though the foreign investors had fully contributed the
registered capital, or using the EJVs or WFOEs as tax shelters (in order to
enjoy the tax holiday) by transfer pricing arrangements between the EJVs or
WFOEs and the foreign investors' overseas subsidiaries.121
Suggestion: The company law should be amended to allow Chinese
nationals and companies, including FIEs incorporated by foreign investors
in China, to incorporate wholly owned enterprises with limited liability
protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problems discussed in this article require amendments to the cur-
rent Company Law and FIE laws. However, foreign legal practitioners and
investors should not be too discouraged by the slow pace of China's legis-
lative action. Due to their communist education and backgrounds, some if
not most of the leading Communist Party members and national legislators
are conservative, and even suspicious of the market economy and capital-
ism.122 A transition period is necessary and inescapable. The important
thing is that China is continuing its progress, both economically and legally,
from a planned economy to a market economy. China's entry into the
World Trade Organization will certainly accelerate such transformations.
121 Small investments from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are not wholly-heartedly
welcome in China at the present time for several reasons. One such reason is the fact that
they are labor-intensive and cannot bring in the modem technologies currently in high de-
mand in China. Moreover, very often they have been found to be in breach of the labor law
with regard to the minimum wages or maximum working hour restrictions, or to be in breach
of the fire-prevention law by failing to provide sufficient fire exits or blocking such exits in
their manufacturing facilities.
After fully enjoying the income tax holidays and tariff exemptions for their manufactur-
ing machinery, some investors liquidated their EJVs and WFOEs at the end of their fifth year
and reopened as new companies so as to once again enjoy the preferential tax and tariff
treatments.
122 Indeed, though such social problems as high unemployment rates and inequitable and
unbalanced enrichment may have already existed before the open door policy, they did not
become apparent until after China implemented the policy.
